


Testing the “Special Relationship:” Skybolt, Nassau, and Anglo-American Diplomacy

Lina Pan
Senior Division
Research Paper

In a December 1962 speech at West Point, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson said: “Great Britain has lost an empire, and has not yet found a role.” Although the statement was one remark in an extensive speech about strengthening the Atlantic Community, it became immediate front-page news in Britain, sparking an outcry disproportionate to its actual importance. The diplomatic tension would have resolved itself, had a controversial decision, kept strictly within upper levels of American government, not leaked to the British press only days later: that America had cancelled Skybolt (Brinkley 601-606; Neustadt 67).



1. A Skybolt missile. Photo: USAF. (Parsch)

GAM-87 Skybolt was an air-launched ballistic missile America offered Britain in 1960 to replace the discontinued British missile Blue Streak (GREAT). Although Skybolt was still in development, it quickly became a fixture in British politics, with the Tory government shaping its Cold War strategies and long-term defense posture around the expectation that Skybolt would become Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent (Williams 154). Because American officials treated Skybolt as a speculative project while British officials regarded it as a concrete one, its cancellation enraged Britain beyond American expectations, aggravating existing Anglo-American tensions and causing relations to plummet (Freedman 186; Nation). This diplomatic emergency, dubbed the Skybolt Crisis, culminated in a conference at Nassau, where President Kennedy negotiated an agreement with Prime Minister Macmillan to sell Britain Polaris missiles to compensate for Skybolt (Brinkley 606-607; Dobson 399; Williams 154). Although the Nassau

Agreement successfully resolved the diplomatic crisis arising from Skybolt's cancellation, it sparked diplomatic, military, and political complications beyond the "special relationship," with long-reaching consequences for both nations.

When Britain's Tory government first proposed developing an independent nuclear deterrent, the idea was financially unsound because of Britain's large deficit from World War II (Dobson 392-393). Nevertheless, policymakers justified costs by arguing that the imminent obsolescence of Britain's manned bomber called for replacement by "some form of ballistic rocket" to give Britain "hope in the long term of penetrating...[Russian] defenses" (Epstein 141; HL Deb 03 239). The true gain the government sought from the deterrent, however, was more diplomatic than martial. According to British Defense Minister Harold Watkinson, "Britain's...position as a nuclear Power...is fundamental to ensure that [its] views carry weight in ...world affairs" (HC Deb 27 1202). A deterrent, though pricy, promised Britain greater bargaining power in Cold War affairs. Britain had considered collaborating with America, with whom it shared a "special relationship," as a cheaper option, but the 1946 American McMahon Act forbade the American government "to share information about nuclear technology with any other power" (Ball 440). Hence, in 1955, the cash-strapped Tory government poured £60 million into the Blue Streak ballistic missile, which was to become Britain's independent nuclear deterrent (Epstein 140; HL Deb 03 236). In 1960, however, the program was cancelled, as research costs had "outstripped [Britain's] [financial] capabilities." With millions squandered, a livid public and Parliament questioned their government's judgment in backing a program so "misconceived, unrealistic and tremendously wasteful" (HL Deb 03 235; HC Deb 27 1214). One politician even accused officials of "clutching at the megaton missile as a sort of virility symbol

to compensate for the exposure of Britain's military impotence at Suez¹” (HC Deb 27 1234-1235).

Nevertheless, the Tories felt justified in starting Blue Streak, believing an independent deterrent would “ensure that the views of [Britain] carry their proper weight in negotiations for nuclear test agreements, in disarmament negotiations and in N.A.T.O. and other alliances” (HC Deb 27 1199; HL Deb 03 250-251). Still, they needed financial backing. Who would provide it?

Enter the Americans.

In what was coined “the bolt out of the blue,” America offered Britain GAM-81 Skybolt², a US missile in development that could replace the failed Blue Streak as Britain’s deterrent. At a March 1960 Camp David agreement, President Eisenhower promised Prime Minister Macmillan that America would “make Skybolt available to Britain *if* successfully developed, with consultation [for alternatives] specified should [it] give up the effort” (Neustadt 30; Greenberg). Britain erroneously assumed that the agreement *bound* America to Skybolt, which would prove a costly miscalculation. Nonetheless, the assumption was justified; Macmillan had promised Eisenhower at Camp David “British bases for United States Polaris submarines in west Scotland” in exchange for Skybolt, and *had* fulfilled his word (HC Deb 26 2345; HC Deb 12 414). The agreement was understood to be mutually beneficial. In offering Skybolt, America saved Britain the expense of development and production, while benefiting itself by freeing British funds to develop conventional forces for NATO purposes, a long-term aim of American


¹ The Suez Crisis of 1956, alternately called the Tripartite Aggression, was a war fought by Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt. The outcome of the Crisis signaled the end of Britain’s reign as a world power, and critically damaged Anglo-American relations.

² The American government could offer Britain Skybolt because the McMahon Act, which earlier prohibited it from doing so, was amended in 1958 to accommodate the Anglo-American Mutual Defense Agreement, which allowed for the exchange of crucial research and information between the two nations so long as they pertained to defense plans (Freedman 184; HL Deb 03 242; United 2).

foreign policy (HC Deb 27 1207; Nation 2). Furthermore, American control over the missile prevented Britain from becoming “an ‘nth’ country outside American control” (Ball 453; Epstein 142). Thus, Skybolt was not a mere gesture of goodwill, but another means of furthering America’s diplomatic agenda.

Nevertheless, some American governmental officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, sought to cancel Skybolt because they thought it ineffective as a weapon, and “prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent” in British hands (Foreign 2; Williams 156-157). When McNamara took office in 1961, Skybolt was developing under the USAF³, the original beneficiary of the missile⁴, who planned to use it to prolong the life of its

B-52 bombers (Defense, Nation). However, McNamara was soon “treated both to slippages in schedule and to increases in cost”; in spring 1962, the price ceiling he set for Skybolt’s funding in fall 1961 was close to



2. A magazine advertisement for Skybolt. Text: “Skybolt is being developed to add a new dimension to America’s growing missile might. Launched from an airborne B-52, it is being designed to arc through space toward targets more than 1000 miles away. The re-entry vehicles for this advanced USAF missile are being developed by General Electric’s Missile and Space Vehicle Department under contract to Douglas Aircraft Company, prime contractor for Skybolt” (General Electric).

³ The United States Air Force.

⁴ Skybolt started as a project Kennedy offered in “compensation” to the USAF for cancelling its B-70 bombers in 1960 (Brookings).

being breached. Still, the USAF continued requesting funds, confident in the program's diplomatic stake. One USAF general remarked: "They can't cancel Skybolt on us. The British are in with us. [McNamara] won't do that to them" (Neustadt 29-30).

Such reasoning, however, ignored McNamara's willingness to "face fearful facts" and "cope with the consequences, British [or domestic]" (Defense 3). After evaluating Skybolt on "technical and budgetary merits," he decided it was "worth neither the cost nor the effort" (Williams 155). Outright cancellation would enrage Britain and the USAF, so McNamara devised a plan to drop Skybolt from the January Budget², and keep silent until mid-December, when it was to be passed through Congress. To salvage Skybolt, the USAF would have to "make [its] case against the backdrop of a massive budget deficit combined with calls for tax cuts," which McNamara felt would fail because the general sentiment was that "foreign policy considerations did not justify foregoing [USD2.5 billion for Skybolt]" (Nation; Neustadt 31, 63). Skybolt's proponents, not McNamara, would appear responsible for its cancellation; hence, they could not accuse him. The domestic predicament would thus be resolved.

McNamara's plan for the British, however, was not so well conceived, primarily because he was not responsible for foreign policy and did not fully appreciate the diplomatic consequences of his decisions (Freedman 191; Williams 157). Intimately tied to British party politics, Skybolt was adamantly backed by the Tory government, who insisted that it *would* still be "genuinely independent" despite being manufactured by America, and protested by the Labour party, who argued otherwise (Epstein 142). Because Skybolt was central to contemporary Tory Cold War policy, its cancellation would incite a political uproar that might "be so serious as

² The Budget of the US Government is the President's proposal to the US Congress commencing funding levels for the following fiscal year. The Budget must be submitted no earlier than the first Monday in January, and no later than the first Monday in February.

to make the Government fall.” However, McNamara erroneously assumed that the Tories could find a substitute for Skybolt and avert the issue altogether (Neustadt 72; Freedman 192). After all, he reasoned, if the Tories wanted to remain “possessor of an independent deterrent”, America could offer them alternatives more technically and financially feasible than Skybolt. McNamara failed to realize that Skybolt *alone*, in British eyes, was synonymous with the “independent deterrent”, or that it *alone* had become *the* measure of gauging the foreign policies of the Tory government (Foreign; Neustadt 37). In assuming that Skybolt could be replaced easily, he failed to anticipate the backlash from its cancellation. Conversely, McNamara’s British counterpart, Defense Minister Peter Thorneycroft, realized the potential for an immense political crisis, and grew frantic upon learning of Skybolt’s fate through unauthorized channels. He knew a substitute was needed, despite its potential unpopularity, for he could not leave such a mark on his party’s record. After deliberation, he concluded the American UGM-27 Polaris ballistic missile to be an ideal replacement as “a viable, politically defensible, and satisfying symbol” of British nuclear prowess. The problem was American officials had to *announce* that Skybolt was doomed before Thorneycroft could request Polaris; otherwise, he would be seen as a traitor for “selling Skybolt down the river” (Neustadt 49, 54). However, McNamara would not announce the cancellation officially until the January Budget was passed, and being insensitive to the finer nuances of foreign policy, he was “not going to offer something before a request was made.” Thorneycroft, too, was “reluctant to ask for something that had not been offered” (Freedman 195). Thus, he waited, as the Cuban Missile Crisis took center stage and pushed Skybolt from the minds of American policymakers (Neustadt 33-36).

Despite the secrecy McNamara accorded Skybolt’s cancellation, word leaked to the public in December 1962. Antagonistic feelings roused, the British public openly questioned the

Anglo-American relationship. Said one angry Londoner: “The Anglo-American crisis was the most serious since Suez” (Nation). After all, Britain had been “doublecrossed by its closest ally”; the Americans had yet to offer compensation for Skybolt, even though Britain *had* given America the bases it demanded at the Camp David agreement where Skybolt was promised (Nation, Brookings). Also, Skybolt’s cancellation meant two consecutive attempts by the Tories to obtain an independent British deterrent had failed spectacularly, giving Labour ample ammunition against them (Defense 6). Meanwhile, the American government appeared insensitive in treating the British, prompting Americans to criticize their government for grossly mishandling the Skybolt situation, with one *Washington Post* editorial remarking acidly that “American officials of highest level should have taken the matter directly to British counterparts” instead of making incorrect assumptions, as McNamara had (Neustadt 80). The situation became an entanglement of domestic and diplomatic failures, causing a critical need to repair Anglo-American relations while redeeming both governments.

Learning from his failures, McNamara proposed a solution in line with Thorneycroft’s earlier desire to obtain Polaris. McNamara, Kennedy, and other officials discussed substituting Polaris for Skybolt under the following terms:

1. [America] would offer appropriate components of Polaris...
2. ...the British would commit their eventual Polaris force to...NATO
3. ...the British would undertake to build up their conventional forces...
4. The terms governing the use of Skybolt would Apply also to Polaris... (Neustadt 82)

Again, America hesitated to pay for a weapon that would be supplied only to Britain, since it had cancelled Skybolt due to its unjustifiable cost. Hence, policymakers compromised by crafting the potential agreement in a way that shifted the deterrent’s control from Britain to NATO, which

would lower the risk of nuclear breakout in Europe, encourage Britain to focus on conventional forces, and meet long-term goals of American foreign policy. President Kennedy then attended a conference with Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau in the Bahamas, to discuss the details of the Polaris purchase (Freedman 195, 196). Initially, Kennedy offered Macmillan a “50-50” resolution, in which America would drop Skybolt as a weapon for *themselves* but continue *development* with the British by halving the expenses (Neustadt 88). This was more suitable to America at the time, as Britain’s purchase of Polaris would raise diplomatic hackles with other European countries, compromising America’s European policy. However, the “50-50” resolution would “require an increase of about 30% in Britain's income tax — a prospect hardly palatable to any government, much less...the hard-pressed Tories” (Nation; Foreign 1). After several days’ debate, Macmillan finally secured Polaris in the Nassau Agreement, on the condition that it would be “made available for inclusion in a NATO...nuclear force...*except where...supreme national interests [were] at stake*” (Neustadt 92). This met the Tory need to bring home a deterrent they could argue as “independent”, while reaching the goals of American foreign policy. With both sides satisfied, the Conference ended on December 21, 1962 (Dobson 249).

Others, however, were not appeased. The British public saw Nassau as a “paper promise of a costly, NATO-tied, American device,” and protested (Neustadt 98). Meanwhile, the USAF continued fighting for Skybolt, fearing Skybolt’s death meant the end of its manned bomber force. In a “last gasp” of resistance, it reported a successful Skybolt test launch, which prior to cancellation had never occurred. However, critics brushed it off as “rigor mortis setting in,” and the Nassau Agreement proceeded (Nation; Defense). As President Kennedy stated in his final State of the Union Address on January 14, 1963:

The Nassau agreement recognizes that the security of the West is indivisible ...that ways

must be found...to increase the role of our...partners in planning, manning, and directing a truly multilateral nuclear force within an increasingly intimate NATO alliance...(Kennedy).

Indeed, the Nassau Agreement met both American and British aims in resolving the Skybolt Crisis; it mended Anglo-American relations, gave Britain an efficient deterrent, and advanced American foreign policy. Its true significance, however, lay in both failure and success. For Britain, Polaris was a good bargain; it was “a seasoned, already operational missile with a range nearly twice what had been planned for Skybolt,” and would assure “symbolism for at least a decade longer than Skybolt and V-bombers could have done” (Foreign 2; Neustadt 54). However, its independence was “very limited and technical,” for it would only “be under national control whenever Her Majesty's Government decide that the *supreme national interests* so require” (HC Deb 23 63; HC Deb 27 1248). As the Tories' deterrent policy relied on a truly independent deterrent, Polaris' dubious status put them in a thorny position in domestic politics. For America, meanwhile, Nassau successfully integrated Britain's Polaris into NATO, but failed to meet America's ultimate goal of divesting Britain of its deterrent to lessen the risk of nuclear outbreak in Europe and focus Britain on its conventional forces. Despite bringing Polaris under NATO control, Polaris was still Britain's in name, and its efficiency extended the lifespan of Britain's deterrent longer than Skybolt would have allowed; in fact, it led to the development of a third-generation British deterrent, Trident, currently in service. American policy thus failed at Nassau in that it precipitated “that which it had endeavored so mightily to prevent” (Greenberg).

More significantly, Nassau opened a Pandora's box: Europe. Prior to Nassau, America desired Britain's entrance into the European Economic Community (EEC), as it realized “the shortest, and perhaps the only, way to a real Atlantic partnership,” and thus to the achievement of

its European policies, “lay through Britain's joining the [EEC]” (George 31). However, French suspicion that Britain was merely a “Trojan horse [that] would allow America a voice in Europe” had existed since Skybolt was first offered to Britain under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, complicating Britain’s entry (Dobson 248; Defense 5). Aware that Nassau could be construed as American favoritism towards Britain, Kennedy offered French President Charles de Gaulle Polaris as well (America). However, de Gaulle, unwilling to possess a nuclear force tied to America and determined to preserve French dominance in the EEC, treated the Nassau Agreement as confirmation that Britain was more committed to America than Europe, and used it as pretext for vetoing Britain’s membership into the EEC in 1963 (George 34-35). By providing de Gaulle with an excuse for vetoing Britain’s membership, the Nassau Agreement compromised American policy in Europe.

Ultimately, the Nassau Agreement tied up some loose ends and left others dangling, but its fundamental purpose was to resolve the Anglo-American diplomatic crisis triggered by Skybolt’s cancellation. In that, it succeeded. If the Skybolt Crisis was a landmark test of the “special relationship” between Britain and America, then the Nassau Agreement was a success cementing that relationship in the eyes of the world. Even if the outcome of Nassau sparked long-term complications for Britain and America, it significantly reconciled the two allies during a tense period in international relations, and hence should be acknowledged for its triumphs as much as it is for its failures.

Annotated Bibliography

Primary Sources:

America to Sell Polaris to Britain. BBC. 21 Dec. 1962. *BBC.co.uk*. BBC. Web. 7 Dec. 2010. <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/>>. Transcript.

This is a transcript of a 1962 BBC report on the outcome of the Nassau Agreement the day it was settled. It offers both the first-hand account and a later addition that puts the information into context.

"Defense: The Dilemma & the Design." *TIME Magazine* 15 Feb. 1963. Time Inc. Web. 1 Oct. 2010. <<http://www.time.com/>>.

This article, written in the immediate aftermath of the Skybolt Crisis, describes the unique role of Defense Secretary McNamara in reshaping the U.S. defense establishment, especially in building up the U.S. capability to fight nonnuclear war. The article analyzes McNamara's strategy of budgeting by function to increase efficiency and save money in the armed forces, and how it led to the cancellation of Skybolt program, which McNamara decided "was simply not worth the money and effort." It addresses how McNamara viewed the eventual outcome of the Nassau Agreement, as well as his contemporaries' uncertainty regarding his view.

"Foreign Relations: Beyond Skybolt." *TIME Magazine* 28 Dec. 1962. Time Inc. Web. 15 Sept. 2010. <<http://www.time.com/>>.

This article, originally in print in *TIME* magazine, was written right after the Nassau Agreement, and provides an immediate perspective on the events. It discusses the decline of the special relationship, the reasons for the anger over Skybolt, and British and American motivations behind the Nassau Agreement. It also puts the issue of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent in the context of greater Western forces and tensions. Both the internal debates and the diplomatic tensions that surrounded the issue are analyzed.

General Electric Skybolt Advertisement. Magazine Advertisement.

This is a vintage magazine advertisement for the Skybolt missile by General Electric.

"GREAT BRITAIN: Scrapping the Missiles - *TIME*." *TIME Magazine* 23 Apr. 1960. Time Inc. Web. 9 Oct. 2010. <<http://www.time.com/>>.

This article, published in 1960, discusses Britain's reluctant decision to cancel its ambitious Blue-Streak project and make itself more reliant on the United States for the development of its nuclear weapons. Interestingly, it mentions that the British were open to both Skybolt and Polaris at the outset. It describes the beginning of negotiations for the missiles, and the possible implications of an independent British deterrent "wearing a Made-In-US label."

Hansard HC Deb 01 August 01 1962 vol 664 cc558-60

This source is a parliamentary record taken from the UK Hansard, the official collection of verbatim parliamentary debate records. It is structured as an interview session between various men and Defence Minister Peter Thorneycroft about the state of UK's defence expenditure. It discusses the skyrocketing Defence Bill and the fate of Britain's independent deterrent within that framework.

Hansard HC Deb 26 October 1960 vol 627 cc2345-7

This source is a parliamentary record taken from the UK Hansard. It is structured as an interview session between various people and Defence Minister Watkinson about the American role in the Skybolt negotiations, which involved putting American Polaris missiles in Scotland.

Hansard HC Deb 27 February 1961 vol 635 cc1198-324

This source is a parliamentary record taken from the UK Hansard. It is a long debate about the defense policies of the British government, with a good portion of it arguing the merits and faults of Blue Streak and Skybolt. This debate accounts for the points of views of various British political parties, including the Tory party and the Labour Opposition.

Hansard HL Deb 03 May 1960 vol 223 cc223-89

This source is a parliamentary record taken from the UK Hansard. It is a long debate about the position of the independent deterrent and how the cancellation of Blue Streak would affect Britain. Points of views of the various political parties in Britain are voiced in this debate, including the point of view of the Tory Party, who cancelled Blue Streak for Skybolt. In mentioning the McMahon Act, it reveals key information on how Anglo-American diplomatic policies affected how the British government treated the development of its independent deterrent.

Kennedy, John F. "1963 State of the Union Address." Address. 1963 State of the Union Address. United States Capitol, District of Columbia. 14 Jan. 1963. *The American Presidency Project*. Web. 7 Dec. 2010. <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>>.

This is the transcript of President Kennedy's final State of the Union Address. It discusses a large number of national issues of time. The portion relevant to this paper is when he mentions the then recently finalized Nassau Agreement, and comments on its larger significance.

"Nation: The Scrap over Skybolt." *TIME Magazine* 21 Dec. 1962. Time Inc. Web. 15 Sept. 2010. <<http://www.time.com>>.

Written just after the decision to scrap Skybolt, this TIME magazine article provides an immediate perspective on the magnitude of the crisis. It discusses both the British and American points of views regarding Britain's independent nuclear deterrent, and how they conflicted with each other. This article was written just the week before the Nassau Conference, so it gives an understanding of the immediate reactions felt by the British and the Americans.

Neustadt, Richard E. *The Report of 1963. Report to JFK: the Skybolt Crisis in Perspective*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1999. 19-122. Print.

This is an extract from the book *Report to JFK: the Skybolt Crisis in Perspective* by Professor Richard Neustadt. It is a declassified report originally meant for President Kennedy's eyes only, and was written in the aftermath of the Nassau Agreement to help Kennedy understand what led up to the American failures at Nassau. It is the most useful primary source I found in describing the American point of view. It is also extremely detailed, as Neustadt had access to many relevant classified documents throughout his research process. In fact, much of the information presented here cannot be found in other written sources, both primary and secondary, as it is first-hand information from the top levels of the United States government.

Secondary Sources:

Ball, S. J. "Military Nuclear Relations between the United States and Great Britain under the Terms of The McMahon Act, 1946-1958." *Historical Journal* 38.2 (1995): 438-54. *JSTOR*. Web. 01 Sept. 2010. <<http://www.jstor.org/>>.

This journal article focuses on the role the relationship between the American and British militaries played in shaping the two countries' nuclear relationship under the McMahon Act, with particular emphasis on the ties between the US Air Force and the Royal Air Force. It analyzes how the British and American governments viewed the link and let it shape the high politics of the nuclear relationship. By offering accounts about nuclear related agreements and talks prior to Skybolt and Nassau, the article concludes that the process of subordinating the British nuclear force to the United States had begun before Skybolt and Polaris was central to the relationship.

Brinkley, Douglas. "Dean Acheson and the 'Special Relationship': The West Point Speech of December 1962." *The Historical Journal* 33.3 (1990): 599-608. *JSTOR*. Web. 22 Aug. 2010. <<http://www.jstor.org/>>.

This journal article discusses the significance of Dean Acheson's West Point speech in the context of the cancellation of Skybolt and the Nassau Agreement. It provides contextual evidence for the decline of the special relationship, and analyzes how Acheson's remarks at West Point, which were made immediately prior to Skybolt and Nassau, exacerbated the outrage the British felt over the Skybolt crisis. It looks at the factors behind the decline of importance given to the special relationship within Washington, and why the British people were shocked by its verbal acknowledgement in Acheson's speech.

Dobson, Alan P. "Labour or Conservative: Does It Matter in Anglo-American Relations?" *Journal of Contemporary History* 25.4 (1990): 387-407. *JSTOR*. Web. 01 Sept. 2010. <<http://www.jstor.org/>>.

This journal article discusses the influence of British party politics on Anglo-American relations. It addresses how party politics in Britain have been significant in Anglo-American relations. It also looks at various diplomatic incidents to analyze the degree the American government was concerned and affected by Britain's domestic policies, which depended on which party was in power.

Epstein, Leon D. "The Nuclear Deterrent and the British Election of 1964." *Journal of British Studies* 5.2 (1966): 139. *JSTOR*. Web. 22 Aug. 2010. <<http://www.jstor.org/>>.

This journal article discusses the relationship between British party politics and the state of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. It mentions Blue Streak and Skybolt, and how their respective failures affected the course of British domestic politics.

Freedman, Lawrence, and John Gearson. "7 Interdependence and Independence: Nassau and the British Nuclear Deterrent." *The United States and the European Alliance Since 1945*. Ed. Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes. New York: Berg, 1999. 179-198. *Questia*. Web. 5 Dec. 2010.

This is a chapter from a book containing a collection of essays about the relationship between America and Britain post-World War II, and is an essay in itself. It discusses in great depth the internal conflicts and diplomatic setbacks that led up to the Skybolt crisis. It also talks about the impact of the Nassau Agreement on the British military services and British politics.

George, Stephen. *An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. *Questia*. Web. 5 Dec. 2010.

This book discusses the tensions in the relationship between Britain and Europe throughout the post-World War II era. It provides a wider context for the relationship, mentioning the role of the United States in influencing Anglo-European affairs, such as the entrance of Britain into the EEC. This source helped me understand how the Nassau Agreement affected Britain's position in Europe.

Gott, Richard. "The Evolution of the Independent British Deterrent." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 39.2 (1963). *JSTOR*. Web. 22 Aug. 2010. <<http://www.jstor.org/>>.

This journal article discusses how the advent of the hydrogen bomb rather than the existence of nuclear weapons spurred the British to have its own independent deterrent. It mentions various Anglo-American treaties and agreements in the formation of the two countries' nuclear relationship. According to the article, there were many debates in Britain about the pros and cons of having a deterrent. The article also analyzes how the concept of the independent British deterrent eventually became less "independent" due to various diplomatic and technical issues.

Parsch, Andrea. "Skybolt." *Encyclopedia Astronautica*. Encyclopedia Astronautic. Web. Sept. 2010. <<http://www.astronautix.com/>>.

This encyclopedia article discusses the technical and operational aspects of Skybolt's history. It provides detailed specifications of the missile as well as its chronology.

The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project. Brookings Institution. The Brookings Institution. Web. <<http://www.brookings.edu/>>.

Completed in August 1998, this project, conducted by the Brookings Institution, led to the book *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940*. It studies in extensive detail various aspects of the history of nuclear weapons development, production, and testing in the United States, with a focus on the economic implications of such developments. This source is cited as Brookings.

Wheeler, N. J. "British Nuclear Weapons and Anglo-American Relations 1945-54." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 62.1 (1985-1986): 71-86. *JSTOR*. Web. 22 Aug. 2010. <<http://www.jstor.org/>>.

This journal article analyzes the political and military rationale behind the Tory government's decision to obtain an independent nuclear deterrent. It discusses various atomic bomb related incidents that occurred during the period the McMahon Act was in effect, and the Anglo-American responses to them, which were not always concerted. It also examines how the American desire for its NATO allies to build up conventional forces instead of relying on American nuclear retaliation put unwelcome economic strains on the British, and how each government's outlooks on the threat from the USSR differed in this aspect.

Williams, Raymond C. "Skybolt and American Foreign Policy." *Military Affairs* 30.3 (1966): 153-60. *JSTOR*. Web. 22 Aug. 2010. <<http://www.jstor.org/>>.

This journal article discusses the nature of Britain's "independent" nuclear deterrent, which actually depended quite heavily on American technology and development. It talks about events precluding the Skybolt Crisis, but focuses mostly on what happened after. It heavily emphasizes the unique role of Secretary McNamara in the cancellation of the Skybolt program. This article provides insight into the technical side of the issue, which is important as the cancellation itself was based almost entirely on technical issues even though the entire affair was highly politicized.